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TORT LAW-Turning Blood into Whine: "Fear of AIDS" as
a Cognizable Cause of Action in New Mexico-Madrid v.
Lincoln County Medical Center
I. INTRODUCTION
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With the Madriddecision, New Mexico joins a minority of jurisdictions that allow
recovery for emotional distress arising from fear of possibly developing AIDS
4
regardless of the threat posed by the actual transmission of HIV. In arriving at its
decision, the Madrid court rejected the tort-recovery principles formulated in the
"fear of future disease" cases. 5 Instead, the court applied the traditional "physical
impact" rule and reasoned that one's fear of developing AIDS in the future is a
rational concern-irrespective of actual HIV exposure-so long as there exists a
6
medically recognized mode of transmission.

1. 122 N.M. 269, 923 P.2d 1154 (1996).
2. See id. at 274, 923 P.2d at 1159.
3. To wit, there may be circumstances under which exposure may be presumed. See id (reciting the analysis
from Williamson v. Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179, 1180-81 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1996), aff'd and modified in part,
696 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1997)).
4. See Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31 F.3d 1197 (2d Cir. 1994); Bordelon v. St. Frances Cabrini Hosp.,
640 So. 2d 476 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d
14 (N.J. 1997); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991). See also James Cahoy, New
Mexico Supreme Court Allows 'Fearof AIDS' Suit in Absence of Proofof Exposure, 9-18-96 WLN 9845, at 1,
available in 1996 WL 524414 ("Going against the prevailing legal trend, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled
...that plaintiffs may sue for 'fear of AIDS' if they have reason to believe they have been exposed to the virus--even
if they have no proof of actual exposure."). The Marchicacase has been distinguished from the other "fear of AIDS"
cases because it involved a claim brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), see 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1994), which employs a "more relaxed negligence standard." See K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 560 n.9
(Minn. 1995). Additionally, the decision from Castro is contrary to subsequent holdings from other New York courts.
See Brown v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 648 N.Y.S.2d 880, 886 (App. Div. 1996); see also Drury v.
Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys., 933 S.W.2d 668, 674 n. 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996); NYApp. Div. Affirms Dismissal of
HIV FearSuit for Lack of Exposure Proof,1997 Andrews AIDS Litig. Rep. 17167 (April 11, 1997) (discussing the
decision in Montalbano v. Tri-Mac Enterprises, 652 N.Y.S.2d 780 (App. Div. 1997)). With the Madrid decision, New
Mexico joins Maryland and New Jersey as the only jurisdictions in which the highest court permits recovery in the
absence of actual exposure. See K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 560 n.9; AIDS Update, 14 No. 9 MED. MALPRACTICE L. &
STRATEGY 3 (July, 1997); Kathy Barrett Carter, AIDS Fear,Not Virus, Enoughfor Lawsuit Supreme Court Rules
for Cleaning Woman Cut by Surgical Knife, STAR-LEDGER, July 22, 1997, at 1, availablein 1997 WL 12543822.
5. More specifically, the "fear of cancer." See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 275, 923 P.2d at 1160 (discussing the
reasoning, holding, and application of Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993)). See
generally Fournier J. Gale, Ill & James L. Goyer, II, Recoveryfor Cancerphobiaand IncreasedRisk of Cancer, 15
CUMB. L. REv. 723 (1985).
6. See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 278, 923 P.2d at 1163.
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The implications of this decision go beyond concerns over excessive litigation,
genuineness of claims, and the reasonableness of claimants' fears. The court's
decision unnecessarily contributes to the gratuitous phobia that continues to surround
AIDS, and promotes irrational beliefs concerning the manner and facility of HIV
transmission. This Note reviews the evolution and current understanding of judicial
tests for NED analysis, questions the rationale employed by the Madrid court in its
opinion, and discusses the implications from Madridof recognizing a cause of action
for emotional distress arising out of a fear of possibly developing AIDS, absent proof
of actual HIV exposure.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 28, 1992, Sonia Madrid was transporting medical samples,
including blood products, from Lincoln County Medical Center in Ruidoso, New
Mexico to laboratory facilities in Albuquerque.7 At some point in transit, Madrid's
hands were splashed with bloody fluid leaking from two to four sample containers.'
The sample containers were inspected when they arrived in Albuquerque and only
a single container was determined to have leaked fluid. Madrid claims that unhealed
paper cuts present on her hands at the time of the incident came into contact with the
bloody fluid. Aware of the widespread publicity surrounding AIDS, Madrid knew
that it was possible to contract the causative virus (HIV) through contact between
open wounds and bodily fluids, primarily HIV-infected blood.
After the incident, Madrid consulted a physician who advised her that due to the
variable latency period 9 of the virus she should be tested periodically over the next
six months to a year. The recommendation was made without knowing whether the
culprit blood sample was HIV-positive or HIV-negative. Not until two months later
did Madrid learn that the patient with whose blood she had been splattered tested
HIV-negative. However, because her physician instructed her to get tested several
times, Madrid felt that the single test result from the source was inconclusive, even
if it was negative. Furthermore, believing that more than one sample had leaked, she
thought necessary additional testing of those sample sources as well. Not until
Lincoln County Medical Center filed an affidavit nearly two years after the incident
did she learn that only one specimen had leaked, and that it was HIV-negative.
Pursuant to advice from her physician, Madrid was prophylactically inoculated
against hepatitis A and B. She was also tested for HIV at periodic intervals over a
span of six months. Test results for this time period all came back HIV-negative.

7. The facts are paraphrased from the court of appeals' opinion in Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121
N.M. 133, 135-36, 909 P.2d 14, 16-17 (Ct. App.), cert. granted, 120 N.M. 828, 907 P.2d 1009 (1995), and affd,
remanded, 122N.M. 269, 923 P.2d 1154 (1996).
8. It is unclear from the fact pattern where the containers were located during transport, and how the leaking
fluid came into contact with the plaintiff's hands.
9. The term "latency period" has been used to refer to both the time lapse between initial HIV infection and
the onset of symptomatic AIDS disease, see Jessamine R. Talavera, Quintana v. United Blood Services: Examining
Industry Practicein Transfusion-RelatedAIDS Cases, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 475, 519 n.l 1 (1993), and the
time between initial HIV infection and the development of HIV antibodies, see Joycelyn L Cole, AIDS-Phobia: Are
Emotional DistressDamagesfor a FearofAIDS a Legally Compensable Injury?, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 333, 337
(1994).
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Madrid sued Lincoln County Medical Center for NIED arising from her fear that
she might have contracted HIV as a result of being negligently exposed to bloody
fluid of unknown origin. She sought damages for medical and other expenses, lost
wages, and for pain and suffering. The Medical Center moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The district court agreed with the rule adopted
by the majority of other jurisdictions "that actual exposure to HIV is a threshold requirement in any claim for emotional-distress damages arising out of a fear of having
contracted AIDS."' 0 The New Mexico Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the
district court's entry of summary judgment. While acknowledging that the majority
of jurisdictions throughout the United States had adopted the "actual exposure" rule,

the court of appeals nonetheless concluded that "threshold proof of the presence of
HIV in the disease-transmitting agent would not be required."" The Supreme Court
of New Mexico affirmed the court of appeals' decision holding that proof of actual
exposure to HIV was not required to sustain a cause of action for NIED based on a

fear of developing AIDS provided a medically sound channel of transmission exists.12
I. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

In terms of a cause of action for emotional distress arising from a negligently
created fear of contracting HIV and possibly developing AIDS, Madrid represents
a case of first impression in New Mexico. 13 While rules governing recovery for NIED
in the context of bystander-liability have been repeatedly addressed and modified by
New Mexico case law, 4 there exists little guidance from the courts concerning the
application of purely traditional elements of NIED.' 5 Therefore, the absence of prior
direction on this topic from the New Mexico courts and generalized ignorance about
HIV and AIDS impels both a review of the etiology of AIDS 6 and an overview of
traditional NIED analysis.

10. See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 270-71,923 P.2d at 1155-56.
11. See id. at 271,923 P.2d at 1156 (citing Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133,138, 909 P.2d
14, 19 (Ct. App. 1995)).
12. Seeid. at 269,923 P.2d at 1154.
13. See id. at 271,923 P.2d at 1156 ("New Mexico precedent is not determinative of this case.").
14. See Gabaldon v. Jay-Bi Property Management, Inc., 122 N.M. 393, 925 P.2d 510 (1996); Flores v. Baca,
117 N.M. 306, 871 P.2d 962 (1994); Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., 113 N.M. 566, 829 P.2d 645 (1992); Folz v. State,
110 N.M. 457,797 P.2d 246 (1990); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983); Acosta v. Castle
Constr., Inc., 117 N.M. 28, 868 P.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1994); Lucer v. Salazar, 117 N.M. 803, 877 P.2d 1106 (Ct. App.
1994); Dawson v. Wilheit, 105 N.M. 734, 737 P.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1987); Zamora v. Creamland Dairies, Inc., 106
N.M. 628, 747 P.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1987); Wilson v. Gait, 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (Ct. App. 1983).
15. The court in Madrid made it clear that the case before it was not a bystander-liability case. See Madrid,
122 N.M. at 271, 923 P.2d at 1156. Notwithstanding, the court spent a considerable portion of its opinion explaining
its prior bystander-liability decisions because "the Court of Appeals' reliance on bystander cases and their related
rationale ... require[d] [the Court] to clarify apparent confusion in terminology and in policies applicable to recovery
for emotional distress." See id The court of appeals' dependence on bystander-liability precedent may be due, in part,
to the fact that only New Mexico cases addressing bystander liability and intentional infliction of emotional distress
exist-precedent addressing non-bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress and "fear of future disease" cases
do not. However, the New Mexico Supreme Court had previously noted that emotional distress outside the bystander
context is compensable under traditional principles of negligence. See Folz, 110 N.M. at 471, 797 P.2d at 260 (citing
Binns v. Fredendall, 513 N.E.2d 278, 280 (Ohio 1987)).
16. See, e.g., Brown v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 648 N.Y.S.2d 880, 884 (App. Div. 1996)
("Any discussion of the elements of proof of a claim for damages based on the fear of contracting AIDS must be
grounded on medical facts about the disease and its transmission.").
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The Etiology of AIDS 17
The acquired immunodeficiency syndrome is an inevitably fatal infectious
disease. t8 AIDS first came to the attention of the United States' medical community
in 1981 following the discovery of several cases of rare skin tumors and lung
infections in otherwise healthy homosexual men. 19 Similar maladies were subsequently observed in intravenous drug users and hemophiliacs.' Taken together, these
findings hinted at a blood-borne and sexually transmitted infectious entity.2' Between
1983 and 1984, French and American scientists independently discovered the

A.

causative agent-a retrovirus2" now universally known as the human immunodefi2 Once it gains access to its human host, HIV preferentially enters
ciency virus (HIV).
specialized white blood cells (CD4 cells) responsible for defending the body against
pathogenic microorganisms such as bacteria, fungi, and viruses.24 HIV commandeers
the metabolic machinery of CD4 cells, turning them into factories for the production
of more infectious HIV particles--destroying the host cells in the process, and
releasing hundreds of new viruses ready and able to infect more cells. 25 This cyclical,
exponential depletion of infection-fighting white blood cells leaves the infected
individual susceptible to a variety of opportunistic infections 26 like pneumonia,
herpes, and fungal infections.27
Although sometimes used interchangeably, the terms HIV disease and AIDS are
not synonymous. Rather, HIV infection precedes and eventually leads to the
development of AIDS. 8 A definitive diagnosis of AIDS requires the combination of

17. For a thorough scientific and medical overview of HIV and AIDS, see generally Alexandra M. Levine,
AcquiredImmunodeficiency Syndrome: The Facts,65 S. CAL. L. REv. 423 (1991).
18. See Mervyn F. Silverman, AIDS Medical Educationfor Lawyers, Judges, and Legislators,in AIDS AND
THE COuRTS 27, 32 (Clark C. Abt & Kathleen M. Hardy eds., 1990).
19. See Myron E. Essex, Origin ofAcquiredImmunodeficiency Syndrome, in AIDS: ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS,
TREATMENT AND PREVENTION 3, 3 (Vincent T. DeVita, Jr. et al. eds., 4th ed. 1997); Alvin E. Friedman-Kien &
Kenneth H. Mayer, An Overview ofthe Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, in COLOR ATLAS OF AIDS 1, 2 (Tracy
Tucker ed., 1989); Dennis H. Osmond, Surveillance of U.S. Cases: Characteristicsand Trends, in THE AIDS
KNOWLEDGE BASE 1.2-1, 1.2-1 (P.T. Cohen et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994).
20. See Essex, supranote 19, at 3.
21. See id., supranote 19, at 4.
22. Retroviruses are viruses that are able to insert their own genetic material into the genetic material of cells
they infect. When the inserted viral genes "turn on," they direct the host cell's own "intracellular machinery" to start
making more virus particles, which egress from the host and repeat the cycle. See HIV/AIDS HANDBOOK 70-77 (Total
Learning Concepts, Inc., 3d ed. 1997).
23. See Friedman-Kien & Mayer, supra note 19, at 4.
24. See Thomas M. Folks & Clyde E. Hart, The Life Cycle of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1,in
AIDS: ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION, supra note 19, at 29, 29-30; see also Jay A. Levy,

Human Immunodeficiency Viruses and the PathogenesisofAIDS, 261 JAMA 2997 (1989) (explaining how HIV
infects white blood cells).
25. See HIV/AIDS HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 69-77; Folks & Hart, supranote 24, at 29-37.
26. Opportunistic infections are caused by pathogens that almost everyone is exposed to, yet only cause severe
and persistent illnesses in individuals with compromised immune systems. See HIV/AIDS HANDBOOK, supranote
22, at 92. See generally Lowell S. Young, OpportunisticInfections in the Immunocompromised Host, in BASIC &
eds., 8th ed. 1994).
CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 706, 706-09 (Daniel P. Stites et al.

27. See Michael S. Saag, ClinicalSpectrum of Human Immunodeficiency Syndrome Virus Diseases, in AIDS:
ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION, supra note 19, at 203, 206-08.

28. It is incorrect, therefore, to say that one contracts AIDS. Rather, a person contracts HIV and may
subsequently develop AIDS. See, e.g., Vance A. Fink, Jr., Comment, EmotionalDistress Damagesfor Fearof
ContractingAIDS: Should Plaintiffs Have to Show Exposure to HIV?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 779, 779 (1995) ("An
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confirmed HIV infection and either a drop in the CD4 cell count below a certain
29
critical level, or the development of one or more "AIDS-associated illnesses." HIV
is transmitted through sexual contact, through blood or blood products, or from
mother to child during the perinatal period.3 ° HIV cannot be transmitted from one
individual to another by mere casual contact.31 Even the risk of transmission through
32
an invasive contact, such as a needle-stick injury, is minimal. After initial exposure,
the presence of the virus can be determined by tests that detect HIV antibodies or

components of the virus itself.33 However, it may take up to six months after initial

infection before a patient tests HIV-positive. 34 Furthermore, an individual infected
with HIV can remain asymptomatic for several years.35
The public concern over AIDS stems from the arcane nature of the disease,
namely: (1) HIV may go undetected in the blood for several months; (2) infected
individuals may remain asymptomatic for several years but still be infectious to
others; (3) there exists no effective HIV vaccine and no known cure; and (4) HIV
individual will develop AIDS only after being infected with [HIV."); Ellen L. Luepke, Note, HIV Misdiagnosis:
Negligent Infliction of EmotionalDistress and the False-Positive,81 IOWA L. REv. 1229, 1229 n.5 (1996) (noting
that HIV infection and AIDS exist along a continuum); Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133, 136-37,
909 P.2d 14, 17-18 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E. 2d 814, 815 n.2
(1990)) (explaining how the sequelae following initial HIV infection eventually leads to a diagnosis of "full blown"
AIDS). See also Dennis H. Osmond, Classificationsand Staging of HIV Disease, in THE AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE,
supra note 19, at 1.1-1, 1.1-4 (noting that the CDC definition of AIDS requires confirmation of HIV infection).
29. See lIV/AIDS HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 85-92. While the presence of IV is usually the minimum
threshold requirement for a diagnosis of AIDS, an exception exists when HIV is undetectable and yet there exist
certain AIDS-associated illnesses accompanied by immunosuppression. See id. at 85. AIDS-associated illnesses
include a variety of bacterial, fungal, and viral infections, see id. at 104, neoplastic diseases, see id. at 118, and several
neurologic diseases, see id. at 128-31.
30. See Josephine Gittler & Sharon Rennert, HIV Infection Among Women and Children and
AntidiscriminationLaws: An Overview, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1313, 1316-17 (1992); Jonathan N. Weber & Robin A.
Weiss, HIV Infection: The CellularPicture,Sci. AM., Oct. 1988, at 100, 100-09; see also Gary G. Mathiason &
Steven B. Berlin, AIDS in the Healthcare,Business, and Governmental Workplace, C780 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 633, 637-38
(examples of sound modes of transmission include use of contaminated needles, sexual intercourse with an lIVinfected individual, contact with HIV-contaminated blood or blood products, and transmission from mother to child
around the time of birth); see generally Sten H. Vermund, Transmissionof HIV-I Among Adolescents andAdults,
in AIDS: ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION, supranote 19, at 147, 147-55.

31. See Harold Jaffe, The Application of Medical Facts to the Courts, in AIDS AND THE COURTS, supra note
18, at 7, 17-20; Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 317
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1132-33 (1987).
32. See Richard Denatale & Shawn D. Parrish, Health Care Workers' Ability to Recover in Tort for
Transmission or Fearof TransmissionofHJVfrom a Patient,36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 755-56 & n.15 (1996).
33. See HI/AIDS HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 201-03.
34. There is a "window" of time between initial exposure to HIV and the production of detectable antibodies.
See Ivan Yip, Note, Aidsphobia and the "Window of Anxiety": Enlightened Reasoning or Concession to Irrational
Fear?, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 461, 470 (1994) (if there are no antibodies detectable by six months it is a "relative
certainty" that the individual is HIV-negative); see also Jaffe, supra note 31, at 8-9 (although HIV may be
undetectable in the blood during the "window" period, the infected individual is still capable of tansmitting the virus).
However, ninety-five percent of HIV-infected patients will test positive within six months of initial exposure to the
virus. See K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 557 n.5 (Minn. 1995). In addition, tests are now available that can
reliably determine the presence of HIV within four to six weeks of exposure. See Mandana Shahvari, Afraids: Fear
of AIDS as a Cause of Action, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 769, 775 (1994). But see Julia A. Metcalf etal., Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Serologic and Virologic Tests, in AIDS: ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND
PREVENTION, supranote 19, at 177, 178 (noting that in uncommon cases it has taken up to three years to detect HIV
using blood tests).
35. See Jaffe, supra note 31, at 11-12; Gerald Schochetman, Biology of Human Immunodeficiency Viruses,
in AIDS TESTING: METHODOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES 18,27 (Gerald Schochetman & J. Richard George eds.,
1992) (noting that HIV may remain in a latency period for up to ten years before symptoms emerge).
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infection eventually progresses to AIDS-a condition that remains invariably fatal.3 6
In this regard, AIDS is much like cancer in that both diseases are latent, usually fatal
conditions that develop at some indeterminable point in time after initial exposure to
a causative agent.37 It is the furtive characteristics of AIDS, coupled with the
sweeping ignorance regarding HIV transmission, that are mainly responsible for the
genesis of the "fear of AIDS" cases.38
B.

The Evolution of NIED as a Cause of Action
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to allow recovery where the defendant's
negligence caused only emotional harm.39 Only when the mental disturbance has
occurred in the context of an intentional tort involving extreme and outrageous
conduct 0 calculated to cause physical or emotional harm to the victim, have the
courts been more willing to allow recovery.4 ' Under such circumstances, it has
generally been required that the distress inflicted be of a severity which no reasonable
person could be expected to endure.42
Unlike situations involving intentional conduct, the courts have taken a more
prudent approach to recognizing compensation for emotional distress claims arising
from mere negligent conduct. 43 The circumspect attitude of the courts to this category
of mental disturbance may be ascribed to tenuous causal relations, the ability of
36. See Silverman, supra note 18, at 31-32; Caitlin A. Schmid, Protectingthe Physicianin HIV Misdiagnosis
Cases, 46 DuKE L.J. 431, 431 (1996). It has been estimated that between 1981 and 1991, 100,000 people in the
United States died of AIDS. See id. at 431 & n.6.
37. See Fink, Jr., supra note 28, at 779; Brian R. Garves, Fear ofAIDS, 3 J. PHARMACY & L. 29, 30 (1994).
However, unlike AIDS, cancer may develop due to a genetic predisposition not requiring exposure to a causative
agent. See Archibald S. Perkins & George F. Vande Woude, Principles of Molecular Cell Biology of Cancer:
Oncogenes, in 1 CANCER: PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE OF ONCOLOGY 35, 36 (Vincent T. DeVita, Jr. et al. Eds., 4th ed.
1993).
38. See James C. Maroulis, Note, Can HIV-Negative Plaintiffs Recover Emotional Distress Damagesfor
Their Fearof AIDS?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 226-27'(1993).
39. See W. PAGE KEETON Er. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 361 (5th ed. 1984);

see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) ("If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an
unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional
disturbance alone, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance."). From the beginning, some courts were
concerned over the potential increase in litigation because emotional distress was difficult to quantify and recovery
of damages relied on conjecture and speculation. See Mitchell v. Rochester R.R. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 356 (N.Y. 1896).
40. Extreme and outrageous conduct has been defined as conduct "beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable as a civilized community." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
41. Under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress or I.I.E.D. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46 cmt. a (1965); KEETON, supranote 39, § 12, at 60. New Mexico first recognized the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, referred to initially as the "law of outrage," in Mantz v. Follingstad,84 N.M. 473,
479-80, 505 P.2d 68, 74-75 (Ct. App. 1972), and subsequently reaffirmed and refined the general principle in a series
of decisions. See Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 118 N.M. 391, 881 P.2d 1376 (1994); Sanders v.
Lutz, 109 N.M. 193,784 P.2d 12 (1989); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983); Andrews v.
Stallings, 119 N.M. 478, 892 P.2d 611 (Ct. App. 1995); Stieber v. Journal Publ'g Co., 120 N.M. 270, 901 P.2d 201
(Ct. App. 1995); Phifer v. Herbert, 115 N.M. 135, 848 P.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1993); Rummel v. Edgemont Realty Partners,
Ltd., 116 N.M. 23, 859 P.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1993); Halddla v. Hakkila, 112 N.M. 172, 812 P.2d 1320 (Ct. App. 1991);
Trujillo v. Puro, 101 N.M. 408, 683 P.2d 963 (Ct. App. 1984); Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 638 P.2d 423 (Ct.
App. 1981).
42. See RESTATEMENT(SECoND) OFTORTS § 46 cmtj (1965); Dominguez, 97 N.M. at 215,638 P.2d at 427.
The New Mexico Supreme Court announced in Ramirez v. Armstrong that the same standard would henceforth apply
to unintentional, negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825 n.1.

43. See KEETON, supranote 39, § 54, at 360.
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claimants to easily feign or imagine emotional injury, concerns over the potential for
44
spurious and vexatious litigation, and hesitancy to punish negligent conduct.
Therefore, in addition to satisfying the traditional elements of negligence, 45 the courts
have generally required proof of more objective criteria in order to guarantee or
certify that a mental disturbance is, in fact, genuine.' Over the years, the courts have
developed several "screening devices" to achieve this goal.4 7
1. The "Physical Injury," "Physical Impact," "Physical Manifestation," and
"Zone of Danger" Doctrines
While "[t]here exists in New Mexico no recognized cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress except for bystander liability" 48 New Mexico has
accepted the traditional rle that where a defendant causes an actual physical injury
to the plaintiff, he is liable not only for the physical consequences of his tortious
impact but also for the emotional distress or mental suffering resulting from it.49 Such
emotional distress damages have been traditionally referred to as "parasitic" to the
"host" claim of damages-they are dependent upon and attach to the physical
injury. 5 Under the physical injury rule, plaintiffs could not sue under a separate tort
cause of action labeled NIED. 5' Instead, recovery was limited to emotional distress
that occurred contemporaneously with inflicted injuries.5 ' Eventually the courts
expanded the "physical injury" concept, permitting recovery under an independent
tort of NIED provided there was some proof of "physical impact. '53 The impact rule,

44. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178-79 (Mass. 1982); see also KEETON, supra note 39, § 54,
at 361 ("The temporary emotion of fright ... is so evanescent a thing, so easily counterfeited, and usually so trivial,
").
that the courts have been quite unwilling to protect the plaintiff against mere negligence ....
45. Namely: duty, breach, causation in fact, proximate causation and injury. See Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d
618, 625 (Tenn. 1997); Victoria L Rees, AIDSPhobia: Forcing Courtsto FaceNew Areas of Compensationfor Fear
of a Deadly Disease, 39 VILL. L. REV. 241, 245-46 (1994); Harris J. Zakarin, Scared to Death:A Cause of Action
for AIDS Phobia, 10 TouRo L. REv. 263, 267 (1993).
46. See KEETON, supranote 39, § 54, at 362.
47. See Rees, supra note 45,at 268.
48. Flores v. Baca, 117 N.M. 306, 310, 871 P.2d 962, 966 (1994). There exists in New Mexico no drafted
jury instruction for non-bystander NIED. See N.M.R.A. Civ. U.J.. 13-1630 committee comment (1997) ("New
Mexico law is not sufficiently developed in this area to permit the drafting of a uniform jury instruction."). In this
regard, New Mexico has followed other jurisdictions in refusing to allow recovery for purely psychic injury,
recognizing that emotional distress is usually a temporary affliction that is difficult to quantify and relatively easy to
feign. See KEETON, supra note 39, § 54, at 361-63; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965).
49. See Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457,471,797 P.2d 246, 260 (1990) (citing Binns v. Fredendall, 513 N.E.2d
278, 280 (Ohio 1987)); see also Martinez v. Teague, 96 N.M. 446,451-52, 631 P.2d 1314, 1319-20 (Ct. App. 1981)
(allowing recovery for mental pain and suffering as a consequence of physical injuries); Higgins v. Hermes, 89 N.M.
379, 381, 552 P.2d 1227, 1229 (Ct. App. 1976) (same). Scholarly writers have long accepted the same. See KEETON,
supra note 39, § 54, at 362-63; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965).
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965).
51. See Mary Donovan, Is the Injury Requirement Obsolete in a Claimfor Fearof Future Consequences?.
41 UCLA L. REv. 1337, 1348-49 (1994).
52. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 176 (Mass. 1982).
53. See id The "impact' rule had its origins in Britain in the nineteenth century. See Lynch v. Knight, 9 Eng.
Rep. 557 (H.L. 1861); Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888) (appeal taken from Vict.).
Although the rule was subsequently overturned in Britain a short time later, see Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669
(1901), by then it had already been adopted by the American courts, see Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y.
1896) and Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897). See also Archibald H. Thockmorton,
Damagesfor Fright,34 HARv.L REV. 260,264-65 (1921) (discussing the adoption of the rule in several other U.S.
jurisdictions).
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which limits recovery to plaintiffs who could prove that the defendant's negligent
conduct caused a "physical impact" or "physical harm" 54 to the plaintiffs person,
became universally recognized by the courts.5 Presumably due to arbitrariness,
however, the courts progressively stretched the boundaries of the term "impact,"
allowing recovery for mental distress flowing from innocuous contact. 6
The terms "physical injury" and "physical impact" are at times treated as
synonyms and at other times, as antonyms. For example, some commentators and
jurisdictions have distinguished a "physical impact" from a "physical injury,"57
treating the two as distinct and separate occurrences.5 Other jurisdictions have linked
the concepts, requiring that a discernible physical injury result from an initial
physical impact.5 9 Still others have treated the terms as indistinguishable.'
In addition, rather than just recognizing emotional distress resulting from a
physical insult, courts permitted recovery for those who could show some subsequent
"physical manifestation" attributable to their emotional distress.6' Eventually, a
handful of courts altogether abandoned the requirement of physical harm and
recognized an independent cause of action for NIED.62 However, many of these same
courts subsequently retreated from this position, eschewing NIED as an independent
cause of action and narrowing the circumstances under which the absence of physical
harm would still permit recovery.6 3

54. The extent of the physical harm required under the rule varies. See, e.g., Plummer v. United States, 580
F.2d 72 (3d Cit. 1978) (finding that dormant bacterial infection satisfies requirement); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating
Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982) (finding that ingestion of contaminated water satisfied requirement despite
absence of physical symptomology). See also Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728, 734 (Md. 1979) (stating that a physical
harm must be verifiable by "objective determination").
55. See KEETON, supra note 39, § 54, at 363.
56. See id. at 363-64 & nn.43-53.
57. See, e.g., Robert C. Bollinger, On the Road to Recovery for Emotional Harm: Is the Fear of AIDS a
Legally Compensable Injury?, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 417, 424 (1995).

58. See, e.g., Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. 11. 1983).
59. See, e.g., R.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 1995); Etienne v. Caputi, 679 N.E.2d
922, 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind. 1991)). See also Fink,
supra note 28, at 781 (discussing the requirement of an accompanying physical injury resulting from an initial
impact).
60. See, e.g., Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31 F.3d 1197, 1202 (2d Cir. 1994); Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457,
470-71, 797 P.2d 246, 259-60 (1990).
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 436, 436A (1965); Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1203.
62. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 814 (Cal. 1980); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509,
520 (Haw. 1970); Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765, 772 (Mo. 1983); St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d
649, 650 (Tex. 1987). As a limiting device, most courts required that the mental disturbance be objectively serious.
See Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 520 ("[S]erious mental distress may be found where a reasonable man, normally
constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress ... ").
63. See Julie A. Davies, Direct Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?,67 WASH. L. REV.
1, 13 (1992); see also, Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278, 281-82 (Cal. 1989)
(limiting Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980)). While physical harm was no longer necessary,
other circumstances were required to establish the breach of a duty owed. In the absence of physical injury, recovery
would be permittmd if the mental disturbance "result[ed] from the breach of a duty owed the plaintiff that is assumed
by the defendant or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or that arises out of a relationship between the two."
Marlene F., 770 P.2d at 282 (emphasis added); see also Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1993)
(establishing that a duty may arise from a statute, the common law, or from the actions of the parties). For example,
recovery of damages for pure emotional distress, absent physical impact or manifestation, has been allowed in the
context of physician-patient relationships, see Marlene F., 770 P.2d at 282 n.5, and where a contractual duty exists,
see, e.g., Flores v. Baca, 117 N.M. 306, 311, 871 P.2d 962, 966 (1994) (mental distress arising from the breach of
a funeral contract), and Chavez v. Manville Prods. Corp., 108 N.M. 643, 777 P.2d 371 (1989) (emotional distress
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In lieu of the physical impact rule, some jurisdictions employ a "zone of danger"
test, which depends upon the proximity of the plaintiff to the risk of harm created by
the defendant's negligent conduct. 64 In this context, "zone of danger" refers to those
persons who are subjected to the risk of physical harm from the defendant's conduct
and who fear for their own safety, 65 as opposed to those persons within the range of
potential risk but whose emotional distress results from witnessing the harm to
another (bystander-liability). 66 However, in most jurisdictions, recovery for
bystander-liability is no longer limited by the plaintiff's presence within the "zone
of danger."6 7 While the development of the "zone of danger" rule seemingly
ameliorated the harshness of the impact rule, several courts still required that
emotional distress be demonstrated by some physical manifestation.68
In New Mexico, the term "zone of danger" has different meanings depending upon
the context in which it is used by the courts. For example, in the case of bystanderliability, New Mexico does not require that a plaintiff be within the "zone of danger"
in order to recover for emotional distress from witnessing the peril or harm to
another.69 In this setting, the phrase describes those "persons having some physical
proximity to the tortfeasor. '' 70 While rejected as a rule for bystander recovery, the
term is, nonetheless, used by the New Mexico courts as a general test of foreseeability: "a description of the class of persons that a reasonable person would conclude
based on the circumstances was subject to a risk by the defendant's acts or omis1
sions."'7
Outside of bystander-liability, most courts continue to apply the physical injury,
physical impact and the physical manifestation rules-alone or in combination-to
NIED claims. Such limiting devices satisfy the need for an objective check on the
legitimacy of emotional injuries, providing a guarantee of genuineness.72 However,

resulting from retaliatory discharge in breach of an employment contract). See also Karen L. Chadwick, Fear of
AIDS: The Catalystfor ExpandingJudicialRecognition ofa Duty to Prevent Emotional DistressBeyond Traditional
Bounds, 25 N.M. L. REv. 143, 149-52 (1995) (noting that "direcf' liability doesn't require physical harm or bystander
status provided that a preexisting relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant establishes a duty to prevent
emotional harm).
64. See Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1203.
65. See Sarah W. Thompson, Note, Actual PhysicalPeril: The New Element to Ohio'sPrima FacieCase For
Negligence?, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 993, 995 (1996).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 313(2), 436(3) (1965).
67. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178 (Mass. 1982) (and cases cited therein).
68. See, e.g., Williams v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 403,406 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Williams v.
Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1070 (D.C. 1990) (and cases cited therein); Leaon v. Washington County, 397 N.W.2d 867,
875 (Minn. 1986).
69. See Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 542, 673 P.2d 822, 826 (1983) (adopting the rule established
in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920-21 (Cal. 1968), with the additional requirement that the plaintiff show some
physical manifestation of his or her emotional distress). Ramirez was subsequently modified by Folz v. State, 110
N.M. 457, 471,797 P.2d 246, 260 (1990) (abolishing requirement of subsequent physical manifestation of emotional
trauma).
70. See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269, 274, 923 P.2d 1154, 1159 (1996).
71. Id. (explaining how the phrase "zone of danger" was used in Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 61,
792 P.2d 36, 38 (1990)).
72. See KEETON, supra note 39, § 54, at 361. In addition to providing indicia of genuineness, the physical
injury/impact/manifestation rules are primarily used to establish duty and causation. See, e.g., Payton, 437 N.E.2d
at 180 ("[E]motional distress is reasonably foreseeable when there is a causal relationship between the physical
injuries suffered and the emotional distress alleged."). In the bystander-liability context, however, the injury, impact
and physical manifestation rules have almost universally been abandoned. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v.
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the desire of the courts to preserve authentic claims for emotional distress at the
expense of invalid ones has resulted in "inconsistency and incoherence" in the
application of these rules."

2. "Fear of Future Disease" Doctrine
Because AIDS only became a recognized disease in 1981,' recovery of NIED
damages for fear of developing AIDS remains a novel remedy, providing fertile
ground for debate. Consequently, most courts have relied upon the rationale and
analysis from the "fear of future disease ' 75 cases for guidance. 76 For nearly a century,
recovery for emotional distress arising from a fear of contracting a disease in the
future has been recognized where the defendant's negligence gave rise to the fear."
The majority of early cases "involved fears that were necessarily short-lived."' It
wasn't until the rise in toxic tort litigation79 that actions for more latent conditions
such as "fear of cancer '80 became more commonplace!' Cases analyzing fear of

Buell, 480 U.S. 557,570 n.20 (1987); see also Madrid, 122 N.M. at 272, 923 P.2d at 1157 (explaining the holding
from Folz, 110 N.M. at 471, 797 P.2d at 260, that a bystander need not suffer an initial physical impact nor a
subsequent physical manifestation to recover damages for emotional distress).
73. See Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tenn. 1996). The frustration in discerning and applying the
various rules was perhaps best expressed in Hunsley v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Wash. 1976), wherein the court
stated: "Any attempt at a consistent exegesis of the authorities is likely to break down in embarrassed perplexity."
74. See Marsha F. Goldsmith, "Critical Moment" at Hand in HIVIAIDS Pandemic, New Global Strategy to
Arrest its Spread Proposed, 268 JAMA 445 (1992).
75. For an overview of American tort law regarding emotional distress as an element of recovery in future
disease, see generally David Carl Minneman, Annotation, Future Disease or Condition, or Anxiety Relating Thereto,
as Element of Recovery, 50 A.L.R. 4TH 13 (1986).
76. See Edward M. Slaughter, AIDS Phobia: The Infliction of Emotional Distress and the Fear of AIDS, 16
U. HAW. L. REV. 143, 154 (1995).
77. See, e.g., Jones v. United R.Rs., 202 P. 919,922-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921) (fear of future disability); Figlar
v. Gordon, 53 A.2d 645, 648 (Conn. 1947) (fear of developing epilepsy); Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 52 S.E.
152, 153 (Ga. 1905) (fear of dying from glass in the stomach); Butts v. National Exch. Bank, 72 S.W. 1083, 1084
(Mo. Ct. App. 1903) (fear of blood poisoning); Walker v. Boston & Maine R.R., 51 A. 918, 919 (N.H. 1902) (fear
of going insane); Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 74 S.E. 885, 886 (N.C. 1912) (fear of developing cancer
from severe bums); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 161 N.E. 557 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928) (fear from swallowing
needles); Southern Kan. Ry. v. McSwain, 118 S.W. 874, 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) (fear of blood poisoning); Elliott
v. Arrowsmith, 272 P. 32, 32-33 (Wash. 1928) (fear of having a miscarriage). As a general rule, the early courts held
that one who negligently exposes another to an infectious or contagious disease, which another contracts, is liable in
damages, provided the feared disease actually develops. See Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo. 1979) (and
cases cited therein); 39 Am. JUR. 2D Health § 48 (1968).
78. Terry Morehead Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a
Pandora's Box?, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 542 & n.121 (1984).
79. For an historical overview of the emergence of toxic tort litigation, see generally Arvin Maskin, et al.,
Overview and Update of Emerging Damage Theories in Toxic Tort Litigation, C837 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 629 (1993).
80. Fear of cancer cases began to appear in the middle of this century. See, e.g., Dempsey v. Hartley, 94 F.
Supp. 918 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (fear of developing breast cancer); Flood v. Smith, 13 A.2d 677 (Conn. 1940) (same);
Kimbell v. Noel, 228 S.W.2d 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (same). Some courts and commentators
have referred to the anxiety of developing cancer as "cancerphobia." See Gale & Goyer, supra note 5, at 724-25. The
term "cancerphobia" was fist used to describe a person's fear of developing cancer in Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152
N.E.2d 249, 251 (N.Y. 1958). However, "cancerphobia" and "fear of cancer" are distinct. The former refers to a
phobic reaction in the absence of objective evidence, while the latter refers to an anxiety caused by the fear of
developing cancer, but is not a mental illness. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 805 n.5 (Cal.
1993).
81. See Glen Donath, Comment, Curing Cancerphobia Phobia: Reasonableness Redefined, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1113, 1113 (1995). Traditionally, fear of cancer was analyzed by the courts as a subset of "nosophobia, the
general fear of diseases." See id.
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developing cancer have usually involved exposure to asbestos fibers,8 2 diethylstilbestrol (DES), 3 and other potential carcinogens or chemical toxins.84 Before permitting compensation for fear of developing a disease at some point in the future, the
courts have required that one or more of the traditional tests for NIED be satisfied 8S-such as proof of a discernible physical injury, 6 or proof of physical impact
or physically invasive contact,8 7 and objective proof of reasonable fear.8 For the
courts, fulfillment of these criteria provided objective proof of "actual exposure" to
a disease-causing entity, a general prerequisite to recovery.89 The policy underlying
the "proof of exposure" requirement is that no reasonable person would fear

82. See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985);
Dunn v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass, 774 F. Supp. 929 (D.V.I. 1991); In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp.
1563 (D. Haw. 1990); In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634 (D. Me. 1986); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am.,
480 A.2d 647 (Del. 1984); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Mauro v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., 561 A.2d 257 (NJ. 1989); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1985). Inhalation of asbestos fibers may lead to a variety of pulmonary disorders, including asbestosis and lung
cancer. See Potts v. Celotex Corp., 796 S.W.2d 678, 679 & n.2 (Tenn. 1990). See generally BARRY I. CASTLEMAN,
ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 1 (4th ed. 1996); Nancy Campbell Brown, Note, Predicting the Future:
PresentMental Anguish for Fearof Developing Cancer in the Future as a Result of PastAsbestos Exposure, 23
MEM. ST. U. L. Rev. 337 (1993).
83. See McAdams v. Eli Lilly & Co., 638 F. Supp. 1173 (N.D. IM.1986); Wetherill v. University of Chicago,
565 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. M. 1983); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. 111.1978); Plummer v.
Abbott Labs, 568 F. Supp. 920 (D.R.I. 1983); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1981). DES was an
experimental drug widely administered to pregnant woman because it purportedly reduced the risk of miscarriages.
See Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 172. DES has been identified as a causative agent in the development of cancer of the
reproductive organs in daughters of the women who took DES. See id.
84. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Anderson v. W.R. Grace &
Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990); Potter v.
Firestone Tuie & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn.
1982); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 461 A.2d 184 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983); (all involving fear of
developing cancer from exposure to chemically contaminated drinking water); Anderson v. Welding Testing lab., Inc.,
304 So. 2d 351 (La. 1974) (fear of post-irradiation cancer); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1958) (same).
85. See Potter, 863 P.2d at 805. See generally Scott D. Marrs, Mind Over Body: Trends Regarding the
Physical Injury Requirement in Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distressand "Fearof Disease" Cases, 28 TORT
& INS. L.J. 1 (1992).
86. See, e.g., Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 179 A.2d 401,410-14 (N.J. 1962) (fear of cancer resulting from
chemical burn injury).
87. The physical impact requirement is usually satisfied by objective evidence of exposure to the diseasecausing agent, irrespective of resulting symptomology. See, e.g., Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir.
1978) (infectious bacteria entering the body); Mink, 460 F. Supp. 713 (ingestion of DES); Laxton, 639 S.W.2d 431
(ingestion of contaminated drinking water); Gideon, 761 F.2d 1129 (inhalation of asbestos fibers). But see Potter,
863 P.2d at 811 (holding that a toxic ingestion or exposure, without more, does not provide an actionable claim for
fear of developing a future illness).
88. See Farrall v. A.C. & S. Co., 558 A.2d 1078 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989). For an in-depth overview of the
parameters utilized by courts to assess the objective reasonableness of mental anguish see, Dworkin, supra note 78,
at 561-63. In the asbestos exposure cases, the courts have allowed plaintiffs to demonstrate the reasonableness of their
fears by permitting expert medical testimony as to the probability of developing cancer and the requirement for
medical surveillance. See Devlin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 499 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
89. Most case law has required that a plaintiff not only demonstrate a physical injury, but also actual exposure.
See, e.g., Harper v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 808 F.2d 1139, 1140 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (no recovery for
emotional distress absent evidence of exposure to disease-causing agent). See also Fink, Jr., supra note 28, at 785
("[Tihe injury requirement often means 'exposure' to a disease-causing agent."); Rees, supranote 45, at 264 ("All
plaintiffs alleging emotional distress due to the fear of contracting a future disease must prove exposure to a diseasecausing agent before allegations of emotional distress will be considered even remotely compensable.").
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contracting a future disease without some medically objective evidence of actual
exposure to a disease-causing agent. 9°
Consequently, "fear of future disease" cases provide instructive precedent
9
concerning the causal links between exposure, injury, and recovery. ' In its
reasoning, however, the Madridcourt largely ignored this panoply of "fear of future
disease" precedent. Instead, the court opted for basic tort doctrine analysis, and
declined to accept the reasoning developed and adopted by the majority of other
jurisdictions.
IV.

RATIONALE

MadridAdopts the "Impact" Rule and Rejects the Majority "Actual
Exposure" Test.
The Madrid decision permits recovery on a cause of action for emotional distress
based upon a negligently created fear of developing AIDS without requiring
threshold proof of actual exposure to HIV, provided a medically sound channel of
transmission exists. 92 In other words, it is irrelevant whether the alleged conduit of
HIV-bloody fluids in the Madridcase-actually contains HIV, or is otherwise HIVinfected. According to Madrid,it cannot be concluded "as a matter of law that at the
time a person is negligently exposed to a disease-transmitting agent (blood) through
a medically sound channel of transmission (open wounds) a fear of contracting AIDS
is irrational." 93
In its reasoning, the Madridcourt relied on traditional tort principles that were
formulated well before the advent of unique diseases like AIDS.' Specifically, the
suffered a
court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to recovery because she
"physical impact" as a result of the Medical Center's negligent conduct. 95 Recruiting
the opinion from Folz v. State, the Madridcourt reasoned that "emotional... injuries

A.

90. See, e.g., In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1567-70 (D. Haw. 1990) (noting that
exposure provides objective evidence of connection between physical harm and emotional distress), Without such
limiting devices, the "task of discerning fraudulent 'fear of' [disease] claims from meritorious ones would be
'prodigious."' Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Ayers v.
Jackson, 461 A.2d 184, 189 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983)). But see Nesom v. Tri Hawk Int'l, 985 F.2d 208, 210
(5th Cir. 1993) (requiring proof of exposure only in the absence of physical injury or contact).
91. See, e.g., Garves, supra note 37, at 30 (noting that the similarity between AIDS and cancer has resulted
in courts analyzing such cases with similar standards); John Patrick Darby, Tort Liabilityfor the Transmission of the
AIDS Virus: Damagesfor FearofAIDS and ProspectiveAIDS, 45 WASH. & LEE L REV.185, 188 (1988) ("Because
of similarities between HIV and carcinogens, courts analyzing liability for transmitting HIV should examine a
defendant's liability under established law for exposing a plaintiff to a carcinogen."). See aLvo Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d
881, 887 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) ("The similarities between terminal cancer and AIDS-their latent manifestation and
their deadly, incurable nature-have led courts and commentators to analyze actions for fear of contracting AIDS
under the same standards as actions for fear of developing cancer.").
92. See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269, 278, 923 P.2d 1154, 1163 (1996).
93. See id. at 276, 923 P.2d at 1161.
94. For example, the impact rule made its debut in the late nineteenth century, see, e.g., Spade v. Lynn &
Boston R.R. Co., 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897), nearly one hundred years before the first case of AIDS was diagnosed.
95. See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 272,923 P.2d at 1157. For this reason the court found it unnecessary to analyze
NIED cases not involving a physical impact. See id.
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which have arisen as a proximate result96 of the defendant[s'] tortious act are
compensable under the traditional rule for recovery. The tortfeasor takes his victim
as he finds him, the effect of his tortious act upon the person being the measure of
damages."' Applying this traditional rubric, the court concluded that limiting
recovery by requiring threshold proof of "actual exposure" is unnecessary because
"[i]t is the invasive 'impact' of the bloody fluid that gives rise to Madrid's claim for
damages under the general rule that emotional injuries suffered by the victim of
tortious impact are recoverable.""
The Madrid court refused to impose the majority "actual exposure" rule as a
limiting device. 99 It cautioned that such a rule would require plaintiffs to prove both
that the conduit of disease transmission carried HIV, and that a medically sound
channel of transmission existed."tu Instead, the court held that once "impact" with the
alleged conduit of disease transmission was shown, only proof that a medically sound
channel of transmission existed would be required.'"' In Madrid,blood coming into
contact with unhealed paper cuts on the plaintiff's hands was cited as the viable
channel of transmission.'l° For the court, a rule requiring proof of a medically sound
channel of transmission, regardless of the presence of HIV, sufficiently limits
potential liability yet permits the adjudication of genuine claims. 3 In support of its
reasoning, the court quoted from the opinion in Williamson v. Waldman: °
[W]here a defendant's negligent act or omission provides an occasion from
which a reasonable apprehension of contracting a deadly disease may eventuate,
and where the quality of the conduct is such to create a presumption of exposure,
the resulting claim for damages by reason of emotional injury may not be
dismissed ... ."'
Implicit in the Madrid court's holding is that claims for emotional distress arising
from a fear of possibly developing AIDS are to be limited to the time period between
the alleged exposure incident, and the receipt of conclusive test results demonstrating
that the plaintiff is HIV-negative.o 6 This so-called "window of anxiety" rule
originated in those few jurisdictions that, like Madrid,rejected the "actual exposure"

96. In its opinion, the Madrid court does not directly address whether the impact with bloody fluid satisfies
causation. The court intimates, however, that the impact makes the emotional injury aforeseeable consequence. See
id. at 274, 923 P.2d at 1154.
97. See id. at 272 (quoting Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457, 471, 797 P.2d 246, 260 (1990)).
98. See id. (citing Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31 F.3d 1197, 1204 (2d Cir. 1994)). The Marchica court
held that where a plaintiff "suffer[s] an actual physical injury ... the rule governing fear of future disease is
inapposite and the traditional negligent infliction of emotional distress analysis applies." 31 F.3d at 1204.
99. See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 272, 923 P.2d at 1157.
100. See id. at 275, 923 P.2d at 1160.
101. See id. at 277, 923 P.2d at 1162.
102. See id. at 270, 923 P.2d at 1155. See also Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr.. 121 N.M. 133, 141, 909
P.2d 14, 22 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts, if proven, to demonstrate that the exposure
incident includes a medically sound method of transmission through the unhealed paper cuts on her hands .... ). The
Madridcourt also made it clear that where no medically sound channel of transmission exists, no claim for emotional
distress will lie. See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 272, 923 P.2d at 1162.
103. See id. at 275, 923 P.2d at 1160.
104. 677 A.2d 1179, 1180-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
105. See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 274,923 P.2d at 1159 (emphasis added) (quoting Williamson, 677 A.2d at 118081).
106. See id. at 277, 923 P.2d at 1162
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test.t" The "window of anxiety" was defined by the Madridcourt as a period of up
to six months because "[u]nder the current state of medical knowledge, the absence
of actual HIV infection will be known within six months after an exposure
incident."'" The rationale behind the six-month time limit is that "emotional-distress
damages must be based upon fears experienced by a reasonable and well-informed
person."' 9 Accordingly, after the "window of anxiety" has passed, reasonable and
well-informed persons should no longer experience continuing emotional distress
0
because they know or should know that they are not HIV-infected." Any persisting
fear would be unreasonable in that it would no longer be proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence."'
Finally, in addition to the rules it articulated specifically addressing the possible
exposure to HIV, the Court noted that recovery of emotional distress damages for
fear of developing AIDS would still require proof of all the traditional elements of
a negligence cause of action." 2 Therefore, under the Madrid decision recovery of
damages in a NIED claim for fear of developing AIDS requires proof of: (1) a
physical impact (exposure incident) between the possible disease-transmitting agent
and the plaintiff, (2) a medically sound channel of transmission existing contemporaneously with the exposure incident, (3) awareness by the plaintiff that the exposure
incident created a possibility of contracting a deadly disease, (4) enduring ignorance
on the part of the plaintiff as to whether or not he or she was actually exposed to a
deadly disease, (5) emotional distress arising during the "window of anxiety," and
(6) all the elements of a traditional claim for negligence.1 3 In short, "[o]nly those persons whose conduct departs from the standard of reasonable care and results in 'an14
exposure through a medically sound channel of transmission will be held liable.""
B. Rejecting the "Actual Exposure" Test Advances the Policy of Deterring
Unreasonable Conduct
In its opinion, the Madrid court addressed a number of concerns that have been
raised as justification for adoption of the majority "actual exposure" test." 5 Posited
concerns have included the possibility of increased liability and medical malpractice
insurance premiums, excessive litigation premised on irrational fears, decreased
compensation for those victims who actually contract FHV and subsequently develop
107. See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1997);
DeMilio v. Schrager, 666 A.2d 627 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995); Tischler v. Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1994).
However, several jurisdictions that have adopted the "actual exposure" test have also incorporated the "window of
anxiety" rule. See Majca v. Beekil, 682 N.E.2d 253, 256 (11.App. Ct. 1997); Brown v. New York City Health and
Hosps. Corp., 648 N.Y.S.2d 880, 887 (App. Div. 1996); Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., 868
S.W.2d 585, 594 (Tenn. 1993). See generally Yip, supra note 34.
108. Madrid, 122 N.M. at 277,923 P.2d at 1162. See also Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133,
137, 909 P.2d 14, 18 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Ninety-five percent of HIV-infected individuals will test HIV positive within
six months of the date of exposure.")
109. See Williamson, 696 A.2d at 23.
110. See id.; Madrid, 121 N.M. at 142, 909 P.2d at 23.
111. See Madrid, 121 N.M. at 142, 909 P.2d at23.
112. See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 277, 923 P.2d at 1162.
113. The required elements were derived by combining the supreme court's conclusion, see id. at 278, 923 P.2d
at 1163, with the holding from the court of appeals, see Madrid, 121 N.M. at 143, 909 P.2d at 24.
114. See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 277, 923 P.2d at 1162.
115. See id. at 275, 923 P.2d at 1162.
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AIDS, and the creation of an unworkable rule that leads to inconsistent results and
discourages settlements." 6 In addressing these policy concerns, the Madrid court
distinguished its reasoning from that formulated in the "fear of cancer" cases wherein
many of the same considerations were involved.
First, the Madrid court evaluated the reasoning from Potter v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co."7 In Potter,the California Supreme Court considered whether emotional
distress arising from a fear of developing cancer in the future as a result of exposure
to carcinogens permits recovery of damages in a negligence action.' The plaintiffs
in Potter discovered that carcinogenic chemicals had contaminated their domestic
water wells as a result of the defendant's negligent operation of a nearby toxic waste
site." 9 The plaintiffs were subsequently exposed to carcinogens via their ingestion
of the contaminated water supply. 2 While not addressing whether the ingestion of
carcinogens qualified as a "physical impact," the Potter court noted that it lacked a
factual basis to decide whether the ingestion had resulted in a physical injury to
which parasitic damages for emotional distress could attach.' 2' Regardless, the Potter
court, relying on its former decisions, eschewed the physical injury requirement as
a "hopelessly imprecise screening device."'2 Instead, the court focused on the
reasonableness of the plaintiffs' fear in developing cancer in the future due to a toxic
exposure. 23 The court concluded that in the absence of physical injury or illness,
recovery of damages for fear of cancer should only be allowed if the plaintiff can
demonstrate that it is medically "more likely than not" that cancer will develop in the
future due to the toxic exposure. 24 The court reasoned that a carcinogenic ingestion
or exposure, without more, does not provide a reasonable basis for fearing future
disease attributable to the exposure."2 From a policy standpoint, the Pottercourt was
concerned about unreasonable claims based upon speculative fears and the magnitude
of the potential class of plaintiffs because "all of us are exposed to carcinogens every
day" and, therefore, "[a]ll of us are potential fear of cancer plaintiffs."'" 6
The "more likely than not" standard from Potter was subsequently applied in a
"fear of AIDS" case by the California Court of Appeals in Kerins v. Hartley.'27 In
Kerins, the plaintiff brought a cause of action for NIED after learning that her
physician, who had performed an invasive surgical operation on her, was HIV-

116. See id.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
See id. at805.
See id. at 801-02.
See id. at 808.
See id. at 807. Other courts have found that exposure to toxins resulting in immune system impairment

or subcellular damage qualifies as a physical injury. See id. at 806 (and cases cited therein).

122. See id.at 810.
123. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 810 (Cal. 1993).
124. See id. at 800.
125. See id. at 811.
126. See id at 811-12. The Madridcourt excerpted the same quotes from Potterin its opinion. See Madrid v.
Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269, 275, 923 P.2d 1154, 1160 (1996).
127. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (1994). Two additional California cases have also applied the Potter standard in the
"fear of AIDS" context. See Macy's Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496 (1995); Herbert v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709 (1994).
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infected. 28 Following the direction given by the California Supreme Court in Potter,
the Kerins court held that:
[I]n the absence of physical injury or illness, damages for fear of AIDS may be
recovered only if the plaintiff is exposed to HIV or AIDS as a result of the
defendant's negligent breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff, and the plaintiffs
fear stems from a knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or scientific
opinion, that it is more likely than not he or she will become HIV seropositive
and develop AIDS due to the exposure."' 29
The Kerins court concluded that the plaintiffs likelihood of developing AIDS was
a "most speculative possibility"' 30 and, therefore, any fear of developing AIDS in the
future was, as a matter of law, unreasonable. 3 1 In support of its decision, the Kerins
court echoed the same policy concerns expressed in the Potterdecision-namely,
effects on the cost and availability of malpractice insurance, excessive litigation, and
for those who actually develop AIDS as a result of
the adequacy of compensation
132
negligent conduct.

Without much elaboration, the Madrid court distinguished its reasoning from that
in Potter,noting that while it is true that each of us are exposed to carcinogens every
day, not all of us are exposed to HIV every day. 33 And while there exists much less
medical certainty when and if one will develop cancer after exposure to a
carcinogen, 34 HIV infection-and, therefore, one's propensity to develop AIDS135
can be ruled out within six months of the initial exposure incident. Therefore,
unlike the indefinite period of time involved in toxic exposure cases, the time period
during which emotional distress may arise after a possible HIV exposure incident is
confined to six months. 136 By implication then, concerns over the magnitude of the
class of potential plaintiffs and the resultarnt flood of litigation are not137the same in the
"fear of AIDS" context as they are in the "fear of cancer" context.
The Madrid court also distinguished its opinion from the Kerins decision. The
court noted that under its rule, it too would have dismissed the plaintiff's claim in
Kerins because in that case, unlike Madrid, no medically sound channel of
transmission was present.138 In Kerins, the absence of HIV exposure through a
medically sound channel of transmission, in part, made the plaintiffs fears
unreasonable under the "more likely than not" standard.13 1 On the contrary, for the
Madrid court, one's fear of developing AIDS after an exposure incident involving

128. See Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 174-75.
129. Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
130. Id.
131. See id. at 180.
132. See id. at 178-79 (also referred to in Madrid, 122 N.M. at 276,923 P.2d at 1161).
133. See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 277, 923 P.2d at 1162.
134. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 811 (Cal. 1993).
135. See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 277, 923 P.2d at 1162.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. In Kerins, the operating physician employed universal precautions and there was no evidence to
suggest that he sustained any cuts during the operation. See Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 174, 177 (Ct.
App. 1994).
139. See Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179.
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contact with blood and unhealed wounds was not irrational. 14° Therefore, the Madrid
court adjudged the policy concerns expressed in Potter,and subsequently adopted
in Kerins, as less compelling in the fear of AIDS context, especially when a
medically sound channel of transmission exists. 4 As a result, the court found it
unnecessary to employ the "actual exposure" test as a limiting device because it
agreed with the argument that "with the channel of transmission test... there is little
in the recognition of a cause of action for genuine cases of
likelihood of disaster
142
emotional distress.
The primary policy objective advanced by the court's ruling was the deterrence of
unreasonable conduct. 43 The court felt that given "the deadly nature of the AIDS
virus, reasonable care should be encouraged... in the handling of potential diseasetransmitting agents such as blood."1" The court reasoned that imposing potential
liability upon those whose conduct may create a risk of exposure to innocent persons
would encourage reasonable care and deter others from engaging in unreasonable
conduct. 4 ' The court concluded that to the extent this deterrence scheme reduces
exposure incidents, "recognition of a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress serves the laudable goal of promoting public health."'' 46 Insofar as
concerns over the impact of its ruling upon the costs of malpractice insurance,
availability of health care services, and the financial resources of defendants, the
court responded that such trepidations amount to unsupported conjecture.' 47 To that
end, the court remarked: "[b]ecause important policy goals are furthered by
recognizing a cause of action for emotional distress from an invasive impact caused
by negligence, we will not rely on unsubstantiated predictions of an insurance crisis
as grounds for defeating such a cause of action. ' '145
V.
A.

ANALYSIS & IMPLICATIONS

The MadridDecision Expands the Impact Rule Beyond TraditionalBounds

1. Misapplication of a Basic Tort Maxim
The Madrid court treated their holding as nothing more than the reaffirmation of
the basic tort maxim: "[t]he tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him. ' 149 This
adage, however, originated from and has been used to illustrate the "eggshell skull"

140. See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 276, 923 P.2d at 1161. The court supported its contention that such fears are
reasonable by citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-9.1 (A) (Repl. Pamp. 1996), a statute permitting the testing of persons
convicted of certain criminal offenses for sexually-transmitted diseases. See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 276, 923 P.2d at
1161 n.2. The court reasoned that because the statute permits RHV testing of criminal sex offenders, the New Mexico
Legislature has recognized that "under circumstances in which a channel of transmission exists" fears in those
persons potentially exposed to sexually transmitted disease are "to be expected." See id.
141. See id. at 277, 923 P.2d at 1162.
142. Id.
143. See id. (citing Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (1990)).
144. See id. (emphasis added).
145. See id.
146. Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269, 277, 923 P.2d 1154, 1162 (1996).
147. See id.
148. Id. at 278, 923 P.2d at 1163.
149. See id. at 272, 923 P.2d at 1157 (quoting Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457, 471, 797 P.2d 246, 260 (1990)).
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or "thin-skulled" plaintiff doctrine." Under the eggshell skull doctrine the tortfeasor
is liable for unforeseeable injuries, but only to the extent that his negligent conduct
has resulted in the aggravation of a pre-existing condition."' This fundamental
principle also exists under New Mexico law. 52 Additionally, the rule applies equally
to both emotional and physical injuries.'53
Application of the eggshell skull doctrine "does not create a new class of
plaintiffs."'"M Rather, it merely prohibits a defendant from eluding liability where his
negligent conduct results in otherwise unforeseeable harm that would not have
occurred but for the plaintiff's inherent susceptibility to injury.' Therefore, under
the eggshell skull rule a plaintiff predisposed to psychological trauma is not
precluded from recovery for emotional distress resulting from a physical injury just
because an individual more normally constituted would not have suffered a similar
harm. 56 Paradoxically, the Madrid court employed "eggshell skull" terminology
despite an absence of facts that the plaintiff possessed any predisposition to
emotional harm or that the defendant's conduct exacerbated any underlying
preexisting conditions (emotional or physical), if indeed the plaintiff had any. While
the plaintiff in Madrid did have pre-existing paper cuts, no explanation or analogous
precedent was offered by the court to support the contention that emotional distress
represents an exacerbation or aggravation of this type of injury. In any case, when the
eggshell doctrine has been employed, at least the courts have required that any injury
be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's negligent conduct. 57
Attention to proximate causation was lacking in the Madriddecision, however.

150. See Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669, 679 (1901); see also Pierce v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 823
F.2d 1366, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The eggshell plaintiff rule simply means that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he
finds him."); Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 773 F.2d 807, 822 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The tortfeasor takes his victim as
he finds him... that is the eggshell-skull rule."); Pierce v. General Motors Corp., 504 N.W.2d 648, 656 (Mich. 1993)
("All first-year law students are taught that a tortfeasor 'takes his victim as he finds him,' and are given the example
of 'the man with the eggshell skull."'); Casey v. Frederickson Motor Express Corp., 387 S.E.2d 177, 179 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1990) ("The thin skull rule is the rule of law that a negligent defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him .. ");
Pace v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 594 N.E.2d 187, 188 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1991) ("This is the rule that the defendant takes
the plaintiff as he finds him, or the 'thin skull' or 'eggshell skull' rule."); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 461 (1964); KEETON, supra note 39, § 43, at 292, § 54, at 363 n.37; 57A AM. JuR. 2D Negligence § 500
(1989).
151. See Keeton, supra note 39, § 43, at 292; 22 Am. JUR. 2d Damages § 922 & n.67 (1989). Prior to Madrid,
the only cases that have used the phrase "the tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him" not to illustrate the eggshell
doctrine or the aggravation of a pre-existing injury are Binns v. Fredendall, 513 N.E.2d 278, 280 (Ohio 1987), Folz,
110 N.M. at 471,797 P.2d at 260, and Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, 408 A.2d 260, 264 (Conn. 1979). The latter
case involved an action for loss of consortium. See Hopson, 408 A.2d at 264.
152. See Hebenstreit v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 65 N.M. 301, 306, 336 P.2d 1057, 1061 (1959);
Martinez v. Teague, 96 N.M. 446, 451,631 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Ct. App. 1981). See also Thomas v. Henson, 102 N.M.
417, 423, 696 P.2d 1010, 1016 (Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that a defendant is responsible for injuries sustained by
a plaintiff in a car accident, including aggravation of the plaintiff's pre-accident condition, limited to the extent that
the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages by not using a seat belt).
153. See, e.g., Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78, 81 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[P]sychological vulnerability is on the same
footing with physical.").
154. Morton v. Merrillville Toyota, Inc., 562 N.E.2d 781, 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
155. See id.
156. See Martinez, 96 N.M. at 451, 631 P.2d at 1319; Padget v. Gray, 727 S.W.2d 706,711 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987). See also KEETON, supra note 39, § 54, at 363 n.37.
157. See, e.g., Whatley v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 351 So. 2d 850, 852 (La. Ct. App. 1977) ("[Tlhe
tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him. However, a tortfeasor is liable only for the direct and proximate results
of his wrongful act.").
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A "Physical Impact" Resulting in an "Actual Exposure" Satisfies Proximate Causation by Making the Fear of Contracting HIV Foreseeable and
Reasonable

The "Actual Exposure" Test Provides the Causal Nexus Between Impact
and Emotional Injury
the
Madridcourt, the plaintiff's fear of developing AIDS was the natural and
For
probable consequence of suffering an impact with bloody fluid.' Without much
rumination, the Madridcourt decided that because a physical impact had occurred,
the traditional rule applied: "emotional injuries suffered by the victim of [a] tortious
impact are recoverable."' 59 Physical contact satisfied causation, reasoned the court,
because it made the emotional harm resulting from the Medical Center's negligent
conduct foreseeable."W In other words, conduct that results in one being splashed
with bloody fluid--even if it is unknown whether the fluid even contains
HIV-should make an attendant fear of possibly developing AIDS foreseeable. In
this regard, the Madriddecision represents a throwback to the early "impact" cases
that permitted recovery pursuant to minor contacts that had no real part in causing the
complained of harm.' 6 ' As noted in Payton v. Abbott Labs, "[tihat these classes of
cases exist is not a sufficient basis for allowing recovery, absent some additional
element of satisfactory proof, for emotional distress which is not a reasonably
foreseeable result of a defendant's merely negligent conduct."' 6 2
While courts have held that establishing proximate causation requires that the
emotional distress be reasonably foreseeable, 63 "[f]oreseeability is only one element
of [causation]."'" Other considerations include "whether the relationship between
cause and effect is too attenuated."' 65 Such considerations explain why the impact
rule as applied by the Madrid court has been abandoned by the great majority of
jurisdictions." 6 While on the one hand, the rule has been criticized as imposing
arbitrary limitations--denying recovery for genuine emotional disturbance in the
a.

158. See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctir., 122 N.M. 269, 274, 923 P.2d 1154, 1159 (1996).
159. Id. at 272, 923 P.2d at 1157 (citing Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31 F.3d 1197, 1204 (2d Cir. 1994)).
In adopting the impact rule, the Madrid Court relied exclusively on the Folz and Marchica decisions. See Madrid,
122 N.M. at 274, 923 P.2d at 1159. Each of these cases involved plaintiffs that sustained physical injuries resulting
from physical impacts, rather than just suffering physical impacts alone as was the case for the plaintiff in Madrid.
See Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457, 461, 797 P.2d 246, 250 (1990), and Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1200; see also, supra
notes 57-60 and accompanying text (discussing how courts and commentators have distinguished physical impact
from physical injury). In fact, the Marchica court noted that had the plaintiff "merely touched [a] discarded
hypodermic needle" instead of suffering an actual puncture wound injury "the case would stand on a different
footing." See Marchica,31 F.3d at 1204.
160. See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 274,923 P.2d at 1159 (citing Williamson v. Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179, 1180-81
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)).
161. See KE TON, supra note 39, § 54, at 363 & n.42.
162. 437 N.E.2d 171, 180 (Mass. 1982) (emphasis added).
163. See, e.g., Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 17 (N.J. 1997).
164. Wyatt v. Gilmore, 290 S.E.2d 790, 791 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
165. See idSee also Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625,630,651 P.2d 1269, 1274 (1982) (setting out the elements
for negligence and requiring "[a] reasonable close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury.").
166. See Fink, Jr., supra note 28, at 781 & n.18; Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 176 n.6 (noting that Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, and Missouri still apply the traditional impact rule).
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absence of physical contact' 67 -on the other hand, it has been castigated when
invoked to permit recovery where the physical impact had but a tenuous causal
connection to the emotional harm. 6 ' Concerns over attenuated causation have
resulted in a more reasoned approach. For example, some courts have held that in
order to recover under the impact rule "[t]he mental injury must be the natural and
direct result of the plaintiff's physical injury. ' The same principle has even been
espoused by the New Mexico courts when discussing the recovery of general
damages for mental pain and suffering as a consequence of physical injuries:
"damages are such as naturally and necessarily flow from the wrong act."' 7 It seems
axiomatic then that some causal connection between the negligent impact and the
mental injury must be demonstrated before damages can be recovered.
In the "fear of future disease" context, actual exposure to the disease causing agent
itself-as opposed to contact with something that might contain a disease causing
agent-has provided this necessary causal link between impact and emotional distress. 17 1 In these types of cases, satisfaction of the impact rule has required proof of
ingestion, inhalation, or some other more direct exposure to the identifiable carcinogen, contagion, or other disease causing entity to which plaintiffs fear they have been
subjected.'72 By contrast, under the rationale from Madrid,satisfaction of the impact
rule only requires minimal contact with the possible conduit of disease transmission,
rather than impact with the disease-causing agent itself. For example, the plaintiff in
Madridexperienced an impact with bloody fluid (a potentialconduit of disease trans-

167. See KEETON, supra note 39, § 54, at 364.
168. See Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 180; Fink, Jr., supra note 28, at 781; see also KEETON, supra note 39, § 54,
at 364 (noting the "absurdity" in certain applications of the rule).
169. See, e.g., Etienne v. Caputi, 679 N.E.2d 922, 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Shuamber v. Henderson,
579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind. 1991)); see also Williamson v. Bennett, 112 S.E.2d 48, 52 (N.C. 1960) ("the emotional
disturbance... must be the natural and proximate result of the injury... ."); Wyatt,290 S.E.2d at 791 ("A tort-feasor
is liable to the injured party for all of the consequences which are the natural and direct result of his conduct ....
");
Luepke, supra note 28, at 1231("Under the [impact] rule, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant negligently
caused the plaintiff to suffer a physical impact, and that the impact directly and immediately resulted in emotional
distress.") (emphasis added); Zakarin, supra note 45, at 267 ("While in a basic negligence action there need only be
a 'reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury,' in an action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress, there must be a direct causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury which the plaintiff sustains."). The same has been expressed in cases analyzing "fear of AIDS" claims. See,
e.g., Doe v. Northwestern Univ., 682 N.E.2d 145, 151 (111.Ct. App. 1997) ("A plaintiff who has suffered a physical
impact and injury due to a defendant's negligence may recover for emotional distress that the injury directly causes.")
(emphasis added).
170. See Higgins v. Hermes, 89 N.M. 379, 381, 552 P.2d 1227, 1229 (Ct. App. 1976) (quoting Mobile City
Lines, Inc. v. Proctor, 130 So. 2d 388 (Ala. 1961)).
171. See Dworkin, supra note 78, at 546. See also Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 881, 887 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993)
("[Ifn the reported cases permitting a plaintiff to recover for fear of cancer from exposure to carcinogens, the fact of
exposure has always been established.") (emphasis added); Drury v. Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys., 933 S.W.2d 668,
673-74 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) ("A common thread nmning through these cases is reflected in the requirement that the
alleged fear... find its origin in actual exposure to a substance or condition capable of causing the feared disease
or malady.")
172. See Joseph C. Kearfott, et. al., Current Issues in Toxic Tort Litigation,SB73 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 25 (1997).
See, e.g., Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1978) (entrance of tubercle bacilli into the body constitutes
an impact); Clark v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 1164, 1182 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (drinking contaminated water
establishes impact); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (prenatal exposure
to DES satisfies impact); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 521 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (inhalation
of asbestos fibers constitutes impact). But see Plummer v. Abbott Labs, 568 F. Supp. 920, 927 (D.R.1. 1983)
(ingestion of DES not sufficient to establish impact).
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mission). At the time of the incident it was unknown whether the fluid was even
HIV-contaminated.'7 3 Yet the plaintiff's cause of action for emotional distress was
not dependent upon proof that she had suffered an impact with, or actual exposure
to, HIV.14 Impact with blood alone was sufficient. In this regard, perhaps the Madrid
decision is better characterized as a "fear of blood" case rather than a "fear of AIDS"
case.

175

Such a holding invites ignorant claims. For example, under the Madrid reasoning
recovery would be permitted "for the fear of developing tuberculosis based on
evidence that a person had coughed in the plaintiff's face, or for fear of cancer where
the plaintiff had inhaled or ingested an unknown substance, all without any proof that
a disease-causing agent was present.' 6 The basis for recovery in Madrid is even
more attenuated: the bloody fluid to which the plaintiff was exposed might have
contained HIV, which might have been transmitted through unhealed paper cuts, and
77
This
which might have survived transmission, maybe resulting in seroconversion.'
78
possibility."'
a
on
based
potential,
a
on
represents a "possibility, based
To avoid such scenarios, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have required
proof of actual exposure to HIV.179 The two-pronged "actual exposure" test requires
proof of both a scientifically accepted channel of transmission and that the alleged
conduit of transmission actually contained HIV. 80 Courts adopting the actual
exposure test have pointed out that "[t]o recognize a cause of action.., when the
presence of HIV is not shown.., is clearly unsound... [f]ear in such situations may
be genuine but it is based on speculation rather than fact."'' Much like the "fear of

173. See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269, 270, 923 P.2d 1154, 1155 (1996).
174. See id at 278, 923 P.2d at 1163 (holding that summary judgment was inappropriate just because actual
exposure had not been demonstrated).
175. In essence, the Madrid Court allowed recovery based upon a superficial contact that played "no part in
causing the real harm." See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 39, § 54, at 363 & n.42.
176. See Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 881, 889 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993). A more explicit example would be allowing
recovery for fear of cancer where the plaintiff inhaled dust particles while removing insulation from pipes in the
basement of an old home, without requiring proof that the inhaled dust actually contained asbestos fibers. See also
Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("[W]hile injuries stemming from a fear of
contracting illness after exposure to a disease-causing agent may present compensable damages, injuries stemming
from fear of the initial exposure [incident] do not.").
177. See, e.g., Neal, 873 P.2d at 889 (presenting an analogous factual scenario).
178. See Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 599 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
179. See, e.g., Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133, 138, 909 P.2d 14, 19 (Ct. App. 1995)
(listing several jurisdictions that have adopted the "actual exposure" rule). See also Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355
(Del. 1995); Russaw v. Martin, 472 S.E.2d 508 (Ga. CL App. 1996); Majca v. Beekil, 682 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997); Doe v. Northwestern Univ., 682 N.E.2d 145 (111.Ct. App. 1997); Blair v. Elwood Union Free Pub. Sch., 656
N.Y.S.2d 52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Montalbano v. Tri-Mac Enterprises, 652 N.Y.S.2d 780 (App. Div. 1997); Brown
v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 648 N.Y.S.2d 880 (App. Div. 1996); Ban v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618
(Tenn. 1997); Drury v. Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys., 933 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (additional jurisdictions
that have all adopted the actual exposure test).
180. See Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 886. However, some courts applying the actual exposure test have not
required direct proof that HIV was present in the conduit of transmission. See, e.g., Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 888. In
those instances where the alleged conduit of transmission is unavailable for HIV-testing, other evidence may be
introduced to demonstrate that HIV was present during the exposure incident. See id. See also Zakarin, supra note
45, at 282 ("[l]f the source of the possible contamination is unknown, then a fear of contracting AIDS will be
genuine.").
considered
181. See Majca, 682 N.E.2d at 256 (quoting Vallery v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 630 So. 2d 861, 867 (La. Ct.
App. 1993)). See also Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 893 (W. Va. 1991) ("[Blefore
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future disease" precedent that spawned the actual exposure rule,'82 cases analyzing
fear of AIDS claims also recognized that "[p]ermitting recovery of damages in tort
for fear of disease based solely upon an unproven supposition that exposure to a
disease-causing agent could have occurred, absent any facts showing that exposure
did in fact occur, would run afoul of the most basic tenets of tort law.' ' 183 Put another
way, fear of disease stemming only from "the possibility of exposure is not a loss or
detriment sufficient to create a legally compensable injury."' 4
But for the Madrid court, the fear of possibly contracting HIV under the particular
circumstances was a foreseeable one because the contact between bloody fluids and
unhealed paper cuts provided a medically sound channel of transmission. 5 Having
the channel of transmission requirement, surmised the court, made the second prong
of the actual exposure test-proof that HIV is present-a redundant limiting
device.18 6 Apparently, the existence of a viable mode of transmission was enough to
"create a presumption of exposure."'8 7 However, if the conduit of transmission does
88
not contain HIV, the possibility of contracting HIV is probably "zero.'
Nonetheless, even if the presence of HIV were to be presumed, it is debatable
whether unhealed paper cuts suffice as a medically sound channel of transmission.
For example, while HIV may be transmitted through contact between HIV-infected
blood and non-intact skin, ninety-nine percent of all reported AIDS cases result from
HIV transmission via sexual intercourse, intravenous drug abuse, or perinatal
transmission.'89 Furthermore, the statistical probability of contracting HIV from a
single needle stick injury-inarguably a more invasive impact than that suffered by
the plaintiff in Madrid-assuming the needle was contaminated, is approximately 0.3
to 0.5 percent.' 90 Even HIV transmission in the health care setting is extremely rare.
To date, no cases of HIV transmission from a physician to a patient have been
reported, and the theoretical risk of HIV transmission from an infected health care
worker to a patient, or visa versa, during an invasive procedure is remote.' 9' Finally,
even if a person is exposed to HIV-infected blood or blood-products, the transmission
of HIV is not certain to occur. 92 Such information underscores the fact that the risk
of contracting HIV from minor contacts is practically a statistical nullity. As noted
a recovery for emotional distress damages may be made due to a fear of contracting a disease, such as AIDS, there
must first be exposure to the disease. If there is not exposure, then emotional distress damages will be denied.")
182. See, supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
183. Lauren . Camillo, Comment Adding Fuel to the Fire:Realistic Fearsor UnrealisticDamages in AIDS
PhobiaSuits, 35 S. TEX. L. REv. 331, 342 (1994). "There is insufficient authority in most jurisdictions to support the
notion that fear of contracting a disease is a compensable injury when there are no facts to show that an 'exposure'
to the disease-causing agent or an 'exposure-causing event' ever occurred." Id. at 346.
184. Id. at 346-347 (emphasis added).
185. See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269, 276, 923 P.2d 1154, 1161 (1996).
186. See id. at 277, 923 P.2d at 1162.
187. See id at 274, 923 P.2d at 1159 (quoting Williamson v. Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179, 1180 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1996)).
188. See, e.g. Russaw v. Martin, 472 S.E.2d 508, 511 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) ("[Tlhe statistical probability of
contracting HIV from a non-HIV contaminated needle is zero .. ")
189. See K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 558-59 & n.8 (Minn. 1995).
190. See DeMilio v. Schrager, 666 A.2d 627, 630 n.3 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1995).
191. See K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 559 n.8; Gittler & Rennert, supra note 30, at 1317. But see Robert C. Gombar,
AIDS in the Workplace: Selected Legal Issues, 350 PL/Ut 103, 154-55 (discussing studies that documented the
transmission of HIV from patients to healthcare workers).
192. See K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 559 n.8.
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by the Court in Doe v. Northwestern University: "[E]ven a foreseeable fear of' 93deadly
disease may not be compensable if the feared contingency is too unlikely.'
b. The "Actual Exposure" Test Assures That Fears Are Reasonable
In addition to making emotional distress foreseeable, the actual exposure test also
satisfies causation by ensuring that one's fear is reasonable."9 Given the statistical
improbability of contracting HIV from incidental contacts, the absence of proof of
exposure to HIV during the alleged transmission incident makes the fear of developing AIDS unreasonable." 5 Undoubtedly, there are instances where individuals
fearing a possible exposure to HIV develop symptomology reflecting the genuineness
of their emotional distress.196 But it is not a question of whether the fear is genuine,
rather it is a matter of whether the fear is reasonable. 1" The reasonableness standard
requires that a plaintiff who fears developing AIDS possess "that level of knowledge
of the disease that is then-current, accurate, and generally available to the public."' 98
This rule places an affirmative duty on individuals seeking recovery for fear of AIDS
to take some responsibility in educating themselves about the plausible modes of H1V
transmission and the realistic risks of developing AIDS.' 99 This "self-education"
requirement has not been viewed as unfair or unduly harsh given the widespread
public information campaigns that have made such information readily accessible,
if not unavoidable.' Absent the requirement, recovery for fear of AIDS would
reward ignorant beliefs about HIV transmission and the likelihood of developing
AIDS."° Several courts have found, therefore, that absent proof of actual exposure
to HIV, any fear of developing AIDS is, as a matter of law, unreasonable.'
In Madrid, however, the court considered one's fear of AIDS resulting from
contact between bloody fluid and unhealed paper cuts reasonable, regardless of proof
of actual HIV exposure.2' Ironically, in support of its position, the court referenced
part of the New Mexico "Public Health Act," ' which permits victims of sexual
assaults to request that their convicted assailants be tested for the presence of sexually

193. 682 NE.2d 145, 151 (1l. Ct. App. 1997). See also Russaw, 472 S.E.2d at 512 (noting that damages can
not be based on "imagined possibilities").
194. See DeMilio, 666 A.2d at 632; Brown v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 648 N.Y.S.2d 880,
887 (App. Div. 1996).
195. See Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 887. Of course, a positive HIV test would be prima facie proof of reasonable
fear. See id. at 886.
196. See, e.g., Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 881, 887 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (discussing how patients fearing
exposure to HIV may experience weight loss, loss of sleep, and other symptomatic complaints).
197. See id.
198. See Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 21 (N.J. 1997).
199. See id. at 22 (citing Shahvari, supra note 34, at 794). It has been suggested that such a rule "effectively
requires plaintiffs to mitigate their fears by learning what they can about the likelihood that they have contracted"
HIV. See Majca v. Beekil, 682 N.E.2d 253, 256 (II. App. Ct. 1997).
200. See Williamson, 696 A.2d at 22.
201. See Majca, 682 N.E.2d at 255; Doe v. Northwestern Univ., 682 N.E.2d 145, 151 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997). But
see Williamson, 696 A.2d at 20 (discussing how the objective reasonableness standard does not effectively counteract
ignorance because it does not directly address the availability of accurate information about HIV and AIDS).
202. See Brzoskav. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1363-64 (Del. 1995); Russaw v. Martin, 472 S.E.2d 508, 512 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1996); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 624 (Tenn. 1997); Drury v. Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys., 933
S.W.2d 668, 675 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
203. See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269, 276, 923 P.2d 1154, 1161 (1996).
204. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-1, -I-9.1(A), -1-9.2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1996)
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transmitted diseases, including I1V.2 The court deemed the statute a recognition by
the legislature that fears are to be expected in those persons potentially exposed to
HIV under circumstances in which a medically sound channel of transmission
exists.2' 6 To the contrary, unlike Madrid, the statute enacted by the New Mexico
Legislature does not "presume" exposure.2 Instead, it permits testing of convicted
assailants to determine whether they are, in fact, HIV-infected, thus providing for a
reliable assessment of the threat of actual exposure posed to victims.' s Under the
Madrid decision, recovery for fear of AIDS would be permitted where a sexual
assault involves criminal penetration because the act would involve both a physical
impact and a medically sound method of transmission. Therefore, the court's use of
the statute to illustrate that actual exposure is unnecessary to demonstrate the
reasonableness of one's fear is paradoxical.
Finally, the court concluded that one's fear of developing AIDS absent proof of
actual exposure to HIV was reasonable because of "the existing circumstances and
the realities of the time," taking into consideration "reasonable reactions of real
people." ° Apparently, it is not unreasonable to fear contracting HIV from blood or
medical waste, even absent proof of the presence of HIV,particularly in "light of
common knowledge."2'1 Unfortunately, this attitude serves to proliferate social
stigmas and irrational phobias rather than justify legitimate claims. Public misconceptions regarding the transmission of HIV and the cause of AIDS should not be
permitted to serve as a substitute for objective proof.
B.

Policy ConsiderationsFavorAdopting a Rule That Minimizes Social
Stigmas and PublicPhobias
Anxiety arising from the possibility of contracting IV and developing AIDS
generally reflects public misperceptions, misinformation, and ignorance about the
disease.2 1' Furthermore, ignorance about HIV and AIDS promotes hysteria and
irrational fears, as well as prejudice, stigmatization and discrimination against those
infected with HIV.212 For example, most people still believe that HIV can be
transmitted through casual contact, that AIDS remains primarily a "gay disease," and
that AIDS, not heart disease or cancer, represents the number one health problem in
the nation.2 " Not surprisingly then, public misconceptions and social stigmas
associated with AIDS have resulted in unsubstantiated fears arising from benign
incidents resulting in an influx of fear of AIDS claims. 2 4 Generalized ignorance and
social stigmas surrounding AIDS implicate serious public policy concerns that

205. See Madrid 122 N.M. at 276, 923 P.2d at 1161 n.2. (referencing N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-9.1 (A), -19.2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1996)).
206. See id.
207. See id.at 274, 823 P.2d at 1159 ("[Tihe conduct is such to create a presumption of exposure ...
(quoting Williamson v. Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179, 1181 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)).
208. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-9.2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1997).
209. See Madrid 122 N.M. at 274, 923 P.2d at 1159 (quoting Williamson, 677 A.2d at 1181).
210. See id. (quoting Williamson, 677 A.2d at 1181).

211. See Chadwick, supra note 63, at 159.
212. See Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 21 (N.J. 1997).

213. See Fink, Jr., supra note 28, at 803 & nn.164-67.
214. See DeMilio v. Schrager, 666 A.2d 627, 630 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1995).
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compel adoption of the actual exposure rule because "[b]y permitting plaintiffs to
recover for mental anxiety over fear of AIDS in the absence of actual exposure, we
risk fueling misperceptions about AIDS and how it is transmitted."2 5 Public policy
reasons in support of requiring proof of actual exposure were perhaps best expressed
by the Delaware Supreme Court in Brzoska v. Olson:
AIDS is a disease that spawns widespread public misperception based upon the
dearth of knowledge concerning HIV transmission. Indeed, plaintiffs rely upon
the degree of public misconception about AIDS to support their claim that their
fear was reasonable. To accept this argument is to contribute to the phobia. Were
we to recognize a claim for the fear of contracting AIDS based upon a mere allegation that one may have been exposed to HIV, totally unsupported by any
medical evidence or factual proof, we would open a Pandora's Box of "AIDSphobia" claims by individuals whose ignorance, unreasonable suspicion or general paranoia cause them apprehension over the slightest of contact with HIVinfected individuals or objects. Such plaintiffs would recover for their fear of
AIDS, no matter how irrational... the better approach is to assess the reasonableness of a plaintiff's fear of AIDS according to the plaintiff's actual-not
potential-exposureto HIV.2"
The Madrid court failed to devote even a single sentence to any of these policy
concerns. Instead, the court declared that its decision would serve as an incentive to
decrease the number of negligent exposure incidents, thereby serving the "laudable
goal of promoting public health."2 7 More realistically, the Madriddecision will serve
the opprobrious goal of rewarding ignorance and promoting public misconceptions
about HIV and AIDS.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Madrid,the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized for the first time a cause
of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress for fear of developing AIDS
arising from possible exposure to HIV. The decision formally recognizes a cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress outside the bystander-liability
context. The Madridcourt adopted the traditional impact rule, permitting recovery
for emotional injuries resulting from a tortious impact, provided a medically sound
channel of transmission exists. In doing so, the court rejected the "actual exposure"
limiting device adopted by the majority of jurisdictions. The decision will do little to
deter unreasonable conduct, but will go a long way in reinforcing social stigmas and
public phobias about HIV and AIDS.
ERIC J. KNAPP

215. See Fink, Jr., supra note 28, at 803 (emphasis in original).
216. 668 A.2d 1355, 1363 (Del. 1995).
217. See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269,277,923 P.2d 1154, 1162 (1996). See also Terry
C. Gay & Paige F. Rosato, Combating Fear ofFuture Injury and Medical Monitoring Claims, 61 DEF. CouNs. J. 554,
557 (1994) (citing Vallery v. Southern Baptist Hospital, 630 So. 2d 861, 868-69 (La. Ct. App. 1994)) (supporting
recognition of a duty not to expose others to a disease in order to reduce its spread).

